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Public Expenditure on Education and Skill
Formation: Is There a Simple Rule to
Maximize Skills?
ROSSANA PATRON & MARCEL VAILLANT
ABSTRACT The ratio of skilled-to-unskilled labour stocks in the economy is widely acknowledged
to have an important role for development. Can education policy affect the evolution of this ratio?
This paper shows that it can: it also shows that the effect of education policy, for a given budget size,
depends on the allocation rule across educational levels, particularly in the presence of systemic
inefficiency. Using a stylized hierarchical education model, the theoretical conditions under which
the allocation rule would favour the accumulation of skills are determined. The analysis has
implication for policymakers in developing countries, where skill formation is much needed, because
it shows that their allocation rules usually violate the maximization condition by assigning higher-
than-optimal resources to higher education.
JEL Classification: I21, I22, I28
1. Introduction
Although the links between skills and growth, and hence education and growth, are well
established theoretically, mainly in endogenous growth theory (see, e.g. Romer, 1986;
Lucas, 1988), the empirical evidence is weak. To explain this, several authors (e.g.
Gemmel, 1996; Birdsall et al., 1998; Papageorgiou, 2003) have stressed the importance of
the distinction between the different stages of human capital creation for development and,
therefore, the relevance of considering the internal allocation rules of the education
budget.
The skill level of the population is usually measured by the average number of years of
schooling of the population; as skilled and unskilled workers are not perfect substitutes,
the structure of the stock of human capital is a crucial aspect. The skilled-to-unskilled
stock ratio in developing and developed countries shows significant differences.
According to data from UNESCO (2009) and OECD (2009), the proportion of the adult
population with less than upper secondary as their maximum educational attainment in
OECD-member countries is, on average, 30% (data for 2007), whereas for developing
countries the proportion is much higher; for instance, in Brazil the rate is 63%, and it is
even higher in many African countries, with rates of over 90%.
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Explanations for this gap are fairly easy to find, as in developing countries the
accumulation of skills is hindered by inefficient education systems, often aggravated by
lack of resources. For this reason, the structure of the system matters because performance
at earlier stages affects the output at higher levels; budget allocation rules should take this
into account. To analyse this point, hierarchical education models have been used by
Driskill & Horowitz (2002), Driskill et al. (2009), Su (2004, 2006), as well as Estevan &
Verheyden (2010). However, this approach is not commonly used in discussing policy
issues in education.
As noted by Su (2004), a hierarchical structure in educational systems implies that
levels are not perfect substitutes, which means that different allocations of similar budget
size have different effects on aggregate efficiency. Following this line of research, this
article discusses the allocation rules of the educational budget in a two-level education
system, using a stylized model characterized by internal inefficiency. In this model,
contrary to that in Su (2004), an individual’s decision to become educated or to enter the
labour market is not modelled; instead, the simple model here assumes a particular dropout
function that easily captures the elements in an individual’s decision to study. Also, unlike
the works of Su (2006) and Estevan & Verheyden (2010), which deal with the political
economy of budget allocation, which is endogenously determined, the focus here is on
the optimal conditions for budget allocation in a steady-state economy, so the growth
approach of Driskill & Horowitz (2002) and Driskill et al. (2009) is not followed.
Although most of the results in the related literature converge, there is a trade-off between
the model complexity in much of the previous literature and the simplicity of this model:
while richer models allow the discussion of a wider set of related issues such as income
distribution or political stability, in this model it is possible to determine the theoretical
conditions for optimal budget allocation. The model allows us to determine the analytical
conditions under which the allocation rule will favour a rise in the skilled-to-unskilled ratio;
this approach also allows us to identify several clear-cut policy recommendations that may
serve as easy-to-follow guides to policymakers in developing countries.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of educational
budget allocation and the accumulation of skills in some developed and developing
countries. Section 3 presents the model and its properties. In Section 4, the conditions
necessary to maximize the stock of skills are discussed. The conclusion is presented in
Section 5. In addition, an appendix with mathematical details is also presented.
2. Overview
The distribution of skills across countries varies considerably, especially between
developed and developing countries (see Table 1). In developing countries, the majority
of the population (more than a half) has primary education or less as their maximum
educational attainment, whereas in developed countries this proportion is extremely low.
In many developing countries, education systems have several weaknesses, especially
in quality and coverage. In most cases, the expenditure on public education per student is
far below that in the developed world, but as argued by Birdsall et al. (1998), Gemmel
(1996) and Papageorgiou (2003), both the size and the efficiency of allocation of public
funds for education are relevant for the overall performance of the system.
Some idea of actual allocation rules can be obtained by examining Tables 2–4. For
instance, Table 2 shows that, in general, there are significant differences in budget allocation
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preferences across the levels, measured by public expenditure per pupil as a percentage of
GDP per capita by education level. The table shows that some countries, such as the USA,
have a perfectly flat allocation pattern (all levels “equally preferred”), while Korea, for
example, allocates less than average to higher education. The situation among developing
Table 1. Educational attainment of the adult population (selected countries); distribution of the
population aged 25 and older, by highest level of education attained (in percentages)
Country Year
Completed primary
or less
Lower
secondary
Upper
secondary
Tertiary
education
Argentina 2004 43.8 14.2 28.4 13.6
Bangladesh 2001 73.3 9.6 12.9 4.2
Botswana 2000 75.3 15.7 5.9 3.1
Brazil 2004 57.5 13.0 21.2 8.1
Chile 2004 24.0 26.0 36.9 13.2
Mauritius* 2000 60.5 18.6 17.6 2.6
Mozambique 2000 96.9 2.3 0.8 0.1
Uganda 2002 88.5 5.1 1.6 4.8
Uruguay 2006 52.8 22.4 15.1 9.6
Australia 2005 9.1 25.8 33.3 31.5
Finland* 2006 22.0 8.9 38.8 30.3
Ireland* 2006 23.7 16.3 31.2 26.4
New Zealand 2005 21.3 51.6 27.1
Republic of Korea 2005/06 11.9 12.6 43.9 31.6
UK 2004/05 14.4 55.9 29.6
USA 2005 6.3 8.5 49.0 36.2
Notes: Latest data available. *Total may differ from 100% because of missing information or rounding.
Upper secondary includes post-secondary non-tertiary.
Source: Data from UNESCO/UIS WEI (www.uis.unesco.org/publications/wei2007); UNESCO (2009).
Table 2. Public expenditure per pupil as a percentage of GDP per capita by education level
(selected countries)
Country Primary Secondary Tertiary All levels
Argentina 12 19 13 14
Bangladesh 9 15 46 13
Botswana 16 41 450 34
Brazil 14 12 34 15
Chile 12 13 13 13
Mauritius 12 19 37 17
Mozambique 16 69 570 23
Uganda 11 32 179 14
Uruguay 8 10 18 11
Australia 17 16 24 18
Finland 18 32 35 28
Ireland 15 22 25 19
New Zealand 19 22 28 22
Republic of Korea 18 23 9 17
UK 20 25 30 24
USA 22 24 24 23
Source: Data from UNESCO database, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.a
spx. Averages of available years 2004–06.
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countries is even more heterogeneous. For instance, while in countries such as Chile and
Argentina the distribution is quite flat, there are many countries that display strong
preferences for higher education, some of them extraordinarily high, such as Mozambique
and Botswana. The variation in resource intensity per student across the country groups is
even higher in absolute terms, as presented in Table 3.
A relevant point here is to distinguish between the shares allocated to different levels
and the absolute expenditures devoted to them. For instance, if we take Argentina, while
Table 3. Public expenditure per pupil (current dollars) (selected countries)
Country Primary Secondary Tertiary All levels
Argentina 536 816 572 631
Bangladesh 39 67 201 57
Botswana 822 2100 22 900 1725
Brazil 566 496 1360 603
Chile 706 783 764 746
Mauritius 622 999 1968 883
Mozambique 46 197 1633 67
Uganda 32 98 542 43
Uruguay 384 456 865 508
Australia 5255 4722 7206 5375
Finland 6864 12 122 13 063 10 583
Ireland 6018 8977 10 263 7823
New Zealand 4452 5176 6749 5254
Republic of Korea 2972 3806 1499 2828
UK 7473 9436 11 277 9044
USA 9573 10 680 10 664 10 267
Source: Data from UNESCO and World Bank, average of available years 2004–06,.http://stats.uis.
unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.
GNP.PCAP.CD
Table 4. Public education budget allocation across levels (in percentages) (selected countries)
Primary Secondary Tertiary Total
Argentina 37 39 23 100
Bangladesh 63 5 32 100
Botswana 26 36 37 100
Brazil 36 41 23 100
Chile 35 36 29 100
Mauritius 40 32 28 100
Mozambique 65 20 15 100
Uganda 71 13 16 100
Uruguay 34 38 28 100
Australia 31 37 32 100
Finland 23 43 35 100
Ireland 36 38 26 100
New Zealand 27 41 32 100
Republic of Korea 45 37 18 100
UK 34 39 27 100
Source: Data from UNESCO, averages of available years 2004–06, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/
ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx
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the budget allocation rule might not be very different from that in Australia, as shown in
Table 4, the size of the total budget introduces limitations to potential outcomes.
Taking the data in Tables 1–4, the observed differences in educational budget allocation
rules and systemic performance, measured by the educational attainment of the
population, lead us to consider the question of the role of budget allocation in skills
formation. For instance, as noted by Gemmel (1996), there is a different skill level that
contributes most to growth for each development stage: human capital effects on growth
are most evident at the primary level in low-income countries; for higher-income
developing countries, the key level is the secondary level, whereas in developed countries
the tertiary level is the most relevant for economic growth. According to this approach, it
seems apparent from the data that many African countries are using allocation rules that
are contrary to their development needs. However, the evidence in less extreme cases is
less easy to interpret. Analysis of the allocation rules for the more general case will be the
focus of this paper. The role of budget allocation rules in the process of skills formation
and the conditions necessary for efficient allocation will be discussed in the rest of the
paper.
3. The Education Model
As the learning process is cumulative, the indicator fm (human capital) is defined as
f m ¼
P
m
qj, which is the knowledge accumulated per student who has completed up to
level m, where qj measures knowledge accumulation per level. A two-level education
system is considered to consist of basic and higher education ( j ¼ B, H). The output per
student qj measures “school quality”, where qj ¼ qj kj
 
, kj is the resource intensity per
student, and ›qj=›kj . 0, ›
2qj=›
2kj , 0. Students leave the system early when the quality
of education that they receive at the lower stage is poor; thus early exit rates u can be
expressed as u ¼ uðqBÞ, where ›u=›qB , 0 and ›2u=›2qB , 0. So, qj at different levels are
not perfect substitutes, and hence the allocation of resources across them affects human
capital accumulation.
Thus, the accumulation process is driven by
dLU ¼ uEBf B
dLS ¼ EHf H ¼ ð12 uÞEB f H ;
where dLU and dLS are the inflow of units of unskilled and skilled labour, respectively. The
marginal ratio of skilled-to-unskilled labour produced can be defined as
jðkB; kHÞ ¼ dLS
dLU
¼ 12 u
u
f H
f B
:
The ratio of skilled-to-unskilled labour in the economy is modified by j; thus, dealing with
inefficiency optimally will allow the achievement of a maximum ratio of skilled-to-
unskilled labour. As the marginal ratio j is dependent on the capital intensity of basic and
higher education, total differentiation and some manipulation result in
j^ ¼ f^H
f B
 !
þ S^
u
;
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where a hat (ˆ) placed over the variables denotes the rate of growth and S is the survival
rate defined as S ¼ 1 2 u.
The evolution of j depends on the effects of allocation on the survival-to-exit rate and
on the relative human capital accumulation across the levels. This is presented in Figure 1,
considering
›
12 u
u
 
=›kB . 0; ›
2 12 u
u
 
=›2kB , 0; › f H=f B
 
=›kB , 0
and ›2 f H=f B
 
=›2kB . 0:
Specific conditions allow us to determine the sign of j (below). In general, dj . 0 when
d f H=f B
 
f H=f B
. 2
d 12 u=u
 
12 uð Þ=u :
4. Properties and Implications
This section analyses the properties of j. The underlying mechanism of the hierarchical
model is simple: the allocation of more resources to higher education will increase the
skilled-to-unskilled ratio (j), but if that budget increase implies lower quality in basic
education, then the effect on j will be the opposite, because the number of potential
entrants to higher education will necessarily shrink. The relative magnitude of both the
effects will determine the net impact on j ; this section discusses the conditions for and
properties of these effects.
The main properties and implications are analysed in the following.
Proposition 1. ›j=›kH . 0, given kB.
The demonstration is straightforward as ›j=›kH ¼ ½ð12 uÞ=uðqH=qBÞ, which is
positive. The property applies to the effects of changes in the budget for higher education
for a given budget for basic education.
Proposition 2. ›j=›kB . 0 if 1u qB . sH 12 uð Þ, where sH ¼ qH=f H and 1u qB ¼
2›u=›qB qB=u (see Appendix 1 for Demonstration 1).
q
1-q
kB
fB
fH
Figure 1. Variability of j components over kB.
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The property applies to changes in the budget for basic education for a given budget in
higher education. From this property, it follows that j is a non-monotonic function of kB.
The capital intensity in basic education will have a positive effect on the marginal ratio of
skilled-to-unskilled labour if the elasticity of the dropout variable to the quality of basic
education (1uqB) is high. Therefore, for a given sH , if the survival parameter is too low, then
the possibility that the increase in capital intensity in basic education will have a positive
effect on the marginal ratio j is higher.
Proposition 3. For a given budget, dj=dkB. 0, if 1uqB=ð1qBkB þ 1qHkH1khkB Þ. sH 12 uð Þ,
where 1ukB ¼2›u=›kB kB=u, 1kHkB ¼2dkH=dkB kB=kH and 1qjkj ¼2›qj=›kj kj=qj, j¼ B;H
(see Appendix 1 for Demonstration 2).
This property describes the effects of changes in the allocation rule for a given budget.
The allocation of more resources to basic education is more likely to increase the marginal
ratio of skilled-to-unskilled labour (j), if the survival parameter 12 uð Þ is low (as in
Proposition 2).
Proposition 4. Given BB ¼ KB=K, when Proposition 3 holds, ›j=›k . 0 (see Appendix 1
for Demonstration 3).
This property highlights the fact that the effect of changing the resource intensity k,
given a particular allocation rule, is positive on the skilled-to-unskilled ratio; it follows
that for a given allocation, the marginal ratio is a positive function of the size of the budget.
5. Are There Clear-cut Policy Recommendations?
For a given budget, it is possible to find a rule to maximize the skilled-to-unskilled ratio of
labour produced by maximizing jðkB; kHÞ subject to K ¼ KB þ KH and technology
parameters.
From the first-order conditions, it follows that
dj
dkB
¼ 0 , 1u kB
1qHkH1kHkB þ 1qBkB
¼ SH 12 uð Þ;
where 1u kB ¼ 2›u=›kB kB=u, 1kHkB ¼ 2dkH=dkB kB=kH and 1qjkj ¼ 2›qj=›kj kj=qj, with
j ¼ B, H. The program has no closed solution, but some clear hints can be obtained. It can
be shown that
1 j kB ¼
1u kB
12 u
2 sH 1qH kH1kHkB þ 1qB kB
h i
:
In addition, considering the “quasi-neutral” assumption on education technology that
1qBkB ¼ 1qHkH ¼ 1qjkj , the above-mentioned expression can be written as
1j kB ¼
u
12 u
1u kB
1
u
2 sH1qjkj
 
2
sH
BH
1qjkj ;
where BH ¼ KH=K is the participation of higher education in the total budget.
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The determinants of the elasticity of j with respect to the resource intensity in basic
education can be shown using the above expression. The elasticity of the marginal ratio
of skilled-to-unskilled labour relative to the resource intensity in basic education is
higher:
. the higher 1u kB , the responsiveness of the early exit rate to the resource intensity;
. the higher SB (sB ¼ 12 sH), the contribution of basic education in total human
capital accumulated;
. the lower BB (BB ¼ 12 BH), the participation of basic education in the total
budget.
The level of the early exit rate (u) has an ambiguous role. The former aspect listed is
a pure technology parameter, whereas the latter is a pure policy variable; the second
value listed is a combination of technology and policy aspects. It must be noted that
education technology plays a crucial role. For instance, in an extreme case 1u kB could be
zero, in which case the effect on j due to an increase in kB would be negative.
These results imply that in many developing countries with bad systemic outcomes
due to the poor performance of basic education, an increase in the share of resources to
basic education (BB ¼ KB=K) could be effective in increasing the amount of skilled
labour in relation to unskilled labour. A simple example will provide more insight into
this issue.
Table 5 presents the benchmark values of the variables of the model, for a reasonable
set-up of parameters corresponding to a typical developing country, and the results of
simulated changes in the size and allocation of the budget. The results displayed in this
table correspond to the following exercises: (i) Benchmark: K low and BB ¼ 0:74 (typical
developing country); (ii) Exercise 1: assumes K high (budget-rich country size) and
BB ¼ 0:74; (iii) Exercise 2: assumes K high (budget-rich country size) and BB ¼ 0:72
(rich country allocation rule); (iv) Exercise 3: assumes K high (budget-rich country size)
and BB ¼ 0:80, conveniently selected.
As the table shows, a higher budget would increase j (Exercise 1); but the rich country
allocation rule is not the best option for the developing country (Exercise 2), as a higher
allocation to basic education (Exercise 3) would be better.
Table 5. Simulation exercises
Benchmark Excercise 1 Exercise 2 Exercise 3
qB 1.093 1.301 1.298 1.308
qH 1.184 1.336 1.344 1.311
j 0.262 0.636 0.633 0.641
u 88.816 76.130 76.281 75.738
kH 1823 10233 11153 7788
kB 585 7005 6802 7558
f H=f B 2.083 2.027 2.035 2.002
ð12 uÞ=u 0.126 0.314 0.311 0.320
Source: Authors’ calculations. Simulation results using data from UNESCO database (average of selected
countries with availability of all required data). Developed group: UK, Ireland, Finland and
Korea; developing group: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay.
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6. Conclusions
The evolution of the ratio of skilled-to-unskilled labour stocks in the economy is relevant
to development policy given the imperfect substitutability of both factors and the central
role of human capital for development. Can education policy affect the evolution of
this ratio? This paper has shown that it can, and has presented the general theoretical
conditions necessary for maximizing it.
The paper follows an increasingly important line of research that focuses on the key role
played by allocation of the education budget in generating skills. The contribution of the
paper lies in the strategy used to analyse the optimal allocation, which has several
advantages. In particular, in contrast to the previous literature, the analysis suggests
theoretically optimal conditions for efficient budget allocation and offers easy-to-follow
rules for policymakers. The stylized version of the hierarchical education model allows us
to focus on the links between alternative budget allocation rules and the production of
human capital. The analytical conditions under which the skilled-to-unskilled ratio will
reach a maximum, given the total resources assigned to the education system, are
discussed thoroughly. Drawing on the data for a set of real economies, it has been shown
through a series of simulations that the optimal allocation rule for a developing country
would require the allocation of relatively more resources (proportionally) to basic
education in comparison with developed countries.
The analysis has implication for policymakers in developing countries, where skill
formation is much needed, because it shows that the allocation rules observed in many
developing countries usually violate the maximization condition by assigning higher-than-
optimal resources to higher education. A further implication is that as long as the marginal
skilled-to-unskilled ratio regulates the wage gap, a less-than-maximum value would
worsen the wage distribution.
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Appendix 1
Preliminary Results
The educational budget constraint is
K ¼ KB þ KH :
By definition, k ¼ kB þ 12 uð ÞkH , where k ¼ K=EB. Thus,
dkH ¼ 2 12 u2 ðk2 kBÞu0
 
dkB=ð12 uÞ2: ðA1Þ
Also, after some manipulations, this expression can be written as
1kHkB ¼
KB
KH
þ u
12 u
1u kB ; ðA2Þ
where 1u kB ¼ 2›u=›kB kB=u and 1kHkB ¼ 2dkH=dkB kB=kH .
Demonstration 1
Total differentiation of j results in the following:
dj ¼ ›j
›kH
dkH þ ›j
›kB
dkB; ðA3Þ
where
›j
›kB
¼ 2 1
uqB
12 uð Þ qH
qB
q
0
B þ ðqB þ qHÞ
u
0
u
 
ðA4Þ
and
›j
›kh
¼ 12 u
u
q
0
H
qB
: ðA5Þ
While the sign of ›j=›kH . 0, that for ›j=›kB is indeterminate. The conditions under
which ›j=›kB . 0 are easy to find. Considering the following definitions, SH ¼ qH=f H
and 1u qB ¼ 2›u=›qB qB=u ¼ 2u 0qB=u, and substituting in Equation (A3) after some
manipulation, the following is obtained:
›j
›kB
. 0 , 1u qB . SH 12 uð Þ:
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Demonstration 2
Inserting Equations (A1), (A4) and (A5) in Equation (A3), as well as using the definition
1u kB ¼ 2›u=›kB kB=u, after some manipulation the following result is obtained:
dj
dkB
. 0 , 1u kB
1qHkH1kHkB þ 1qBkB
. SH 12 uð Þ:
It can also be shown that
1 j kB ¼
1u kB
12 u
2 SH 1qH kH1kHkB þ 1qB kB
h i
:
Inserting Equation (A2) in the above expression and defining BH ¼ KH=K, and
considering the “quasi-neutral” assumption that 1qBkB ¼ 1qHkH ¼ 1qjkj , the following is
obtained:
1 j kB ¼
1u kB
12 u
12 SH1qj kju
 
2
SH
BH
1qjkj :
Demonstration 3
›j=›k . 0 as ›j›k ¼ ›j›kB ›kB›k þ ›j›kH ›kH›k , is positive, resulting from ›kB›k ; ›kH›k positive for given
allocation structure, and ›j›kB ;
›j
›kH
positive for increasing budget allocated to basic and
higher education (Proposition 2 holds).
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